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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Under Section 209(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 
1059(a)(1), an employer has an obligation to maintain records 
sufficient to determine the benefits due or which may become 
due to each of its employees.  This appeal concerns the 
circumstances under which an employer can be held liable for 
failing to maintain such records.  Appellant Mary Henderson 
brought this putative class action against the University of 
Pittsburgh Medical Center (“UPMC”), alleging that UPMC 
failed to keep records of the hours Henderson had worked.  
The District Court held that Henderson failed to state a claim 
because under the applicable employee benefit plans, UPMC 
was only required to keep records of wages paid and not 
hours worked.  Henderson appeals.      
 
I.
1
 
 
Henderson‟s Second Amended Complaint alleges that 
while employed as a registered nurse for UPMC, she and 
other nurses were required to work during their thirty-minute 
unpaid “meal breaks,” but were never compensated for this 
work.  App. at 31.  In addition, UPMC began increasing the 
number of patients assigned to each nurse per shift.  Nurses 
were allocated thirty minutes of paid time at the beginning of 
their shifts to review the status reports of the patients they 
would cover during the upcoming shift.  The complaint 
alleges that as a result of the increased patient load, nurses 
such as Henderson had to begin arriving at work and 
                                              
1
  We set forth only those facts that are relevant to our 
holding and, where we do so, we view them in the light most 
favorable to the appellant as set forth in her Second Amended 
Complaint.   
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reviewing the status reports twenty to forty minutes prior to 
the official start of their shift.  Even though the nurses 
clocked in when they arrived, UPMC would not start 
crediting the nurses with paid work time until the official start 
of the shift.  Henderson filed a lawsuit in state court alleging 
that UPMC violated the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and 
Collection law and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.  
Henderson v. UPMC, No. GD-09-13303 (Court of Common 
Pleas, Allegheny County, Pa. filed July 23, 2009).
2
  That suit 
remains pending. 
 
She also brought this ERISA action based on her 
participation in three retirement plans, all administered and 
sponsored by UPMC.  Under the 401A and 403B Retirement 
Savings Plans, defined contribution plans which the parties 
refer to collectively as the “Savings Plan,” plan participants 
may direct a percentage of their compensation to their 
individual savings accounts.  Under those plans, after the 
employee has worked for a year UPMC will pay into the 
account of each participating employee a matching 
contribution equal to fifty percent of the amount of the 
participant‟s contribution, subject to a ceiling equal to a 
percentage of the participant‟s compensation.  It follows that 
both the contributions of the participating employees and 
UPMC are based on a percentage of the “Participant‟s 
Compensation.”  App. at 221, 340.  “Compensation” is 
defined as “the Employee‟s compensation as reportable on 
Box 1 of Form W-2.”  App. at 207, 324.   
 
UPMC also offers a third plan, the Basic Retirement or 
Cash Balance Plan, which is a defined benefit plan funded 
entirely by UPMC.  Each year in which a participant is paid 
for at least 1,000 hours of work, the participant earns 
retirement credits.  Each retirement credit is based on a 
percentage multiplied by the participant‟s pay, with the 
                                              
2
 Another nurse at UPMC filed a wage lawsuit under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act in federal court, Camesi v. 
UPMC, No. 09-CV-85-CB (W.D. Pa. filed Apr. 2, 2009).  
Henderson attempted to join this suit, but her claim was 
dismissed as untimely filed.   
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percentage being based upon the participant‟s age and years 
of service.  The plan provides that “Retirement Credits shall 
be applied on the basis of the Employee‟s Compensation 
earned while an Active Participant” in the Cash Balance Plan 
during the Plan Year.  App. at 521.  “Compensation” here too 
is defined as “an Active Participant‟s compensation as 
reportable in Box 1 of Form W-2.”  App. at 502.   
 
Henderson contends that these plans and the ERISA 
statute which controls them require that UPMC, as an 
employer, keep records of the uncompensated hours she 
worked and, as a fiduciary, to investigate and ensure that 
contributions allegedly corresponding to the hours worked 
were being provided so that the relevant fund can distribute 
benefits to Henderson when she retires.  Specifically, she 
alleges that “UPMC failed to maintain records . . . sufficient 
to determine the benefits due,” in violation of Section 
209(a)(1) of ERISA.  App. at 49.  Henderson also claims that 
UPMC breached its fiduciary duty under Section 404(a), 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a), “to act prudently and solely in the interests 
of [Henderson and her coworkers] by failing to credit them 
with all hours worked for which they were entitled to be paid 
when calculating their pension benefits, or to investigate 
whether such hours should be credited.”  App. at 50.  By way 
of remedies, Henderson seeks equitable relief pursuant to 
Section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C § 1132(a)(3), and “[a]ll 
applicable statutory benefits and contributions” pursuant to 
Section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C § 1132(a)(1)(B).  App. at 51.   
 
UPMC moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
Without deciding whether an employee can “shoe horn” a 
remedy for fair wage violations into an ERISA cause of 
action, the District Court granted the motion and dismissed 
the complaint with prejudice.  The Court held that UPMC‟s 
recording and fiduciary obligations were limited by the plan 
language, which only required that UPMC document the 
wages Henderson was paid, not the hours she allegedly 
worked but was not paid.  Henderson v. UPMC, No. 09-187J, 
2010 WL 235117, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2010).     
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II. 
  
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and we have appellate  jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We exercise plenary review of a district court‟s order 
granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 
(3d Cir. 2009).  In so doing, we must accept all well-pleaded 
factual allegations contained in the complaint as true and 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 
Henderson.  See id.    
 
III. 
 
 ERISA permits employers who are also pension plan 
administrators to wear separate “hats” and imposes different 
duties on them depending on whether they are acting as 
employers qua employers or employers qua administrators.  
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 498 (1996).  When 
acting as the plan administrator, ERISA imposes fiduciary 
duties “to ensure that a plan receives all funds to which it is 
entitled, so that those funds can be used on behalf of 
participants and beneficiaries.”  Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas 
Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 571 
(1985); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (“[A] fiduciary shall 
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”).    
 
 Conversely, when making business or employment 
decisions, ERISA permits an employer qua employer to make 
decisions in its interest, rather than the interest of plan 
participants.  See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 498.  That said, 
ERISA contains a limited number of separate “employer” 
duties wholly apart from any fiduciary obligations an 
employer may incur while serving as a fiduciary.  Section 209 
is one of these employer duties.  Section 209(a) provides that 
“every employer shall . . . maintain records with respect to 
each of his employees sufficient to determine the benefits due 
or which may become due to such employees.”  Subsection 
(b) provides that if “any person who is required, under 
subsection (a) [of this section], to furnish information or 
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maintain records for any plan year fails to comply with such 
requirement, he shall pay to the Secretary [of Labor] a civil 
penalty of $10 for each employee with respect to whom such 
failure occurs.”     
 
 Cognizant of the different roles that an employer may 
play, we easily conclude, in this case, that UPMC has a duty 
as an employer to keep records sufficient to accurately 
determine what benefits are due or may be due to plan 
participants and, as a fiduciary, a duty to ensure that 
contributions were being properly provided to the plan by the 
employer.  But the extent of those duties and the nature of the 
records required to be maintained can only be determined by 
looking to the language of the pension plans themselves, 
which outline the contributions the employer must make and, 
correspondingly, the benefits the participants are owed.    
 
In so holding, we join the several other courts that 
have determined the scope of the Section 209 record-keeping 
duty, and its fiduciary corollary, by evaluating how 
contributions are allocated under the pension plan.  See Trs. 
of the Chi. Painters & Decorators Pension v. Royal Int’l 
Drywall & Decorating, Inc., 493 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 
2007) (evaluating scope of Section 209 record-keeping duty 
by looking to plan language); Mich. Laborers’ Health Care 
Fund v. Grimaldi Concrete, Inc., 30 F.3d 692, 697 (6th Cir. 
1994) (same); Combs v. King, 764 F.2d 818, 825 (11th Cir. 
1985) (same); Zipp v. World Mortg. Co., 632 F. Supp. 2d 
1117, 1125 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (same); see also Mathews v. 
ALC Partner, Inc., No. 08-cv-10636, 2009 WL 3837249, at 
*3-7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2009) (evaluating scope of 
fiduciary duty by looking to plan language); Steavens v. Elec. 
Data Sys. Corp., No. 07-14536, 2008 WL 3540070, at *4 
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2008) (same).   
 
We look to the plans, three of which are relevant here.  
As discussed, under the two Savings Plans, contributions 
from both the employee and the employer are linked to a 
percentage of the employee‟s compensation.  Compensation 
is defined as “the Employee‟s compensation as reportable on 
Box 1 of Form W-2.”  App. at 207, 324.  Similarly, under the 
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Basic Retirement Plan “Retirement Credits shall be applied 
on the basis of the Employee‟s Compensation earned while an 
Active Participant with a Cash Balance Employer during the 
Plan Year,” App. at 521, and  “Compensation” is defined as 
“an Active Participant‟s compensation as reportable in Box 1 
of Form W-2,” App. at 502.   
 
Compensation reportable in Box 1 of Form W-2 is 
undeniably compensation paid.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6051(a) 
(requiring employers to send Form W-2 to each employee 
outlining “the remuneration paid by [the employer] to such 
employee during the calendar year”); App. at 953 (IRS 
Instructions for Forms W-2 and W-3, providing: “Box 1—
Wages, tips, other compensation.  Show the total taxable 
wages, tips, and other compensation (before any payroll 
deductions) that you paid to your employee during the 
year.”).  An employee does not have to report to the IRS or 
pay taxes on compensation that she never receives, and an 
employer does not have to report compensation that it never 
paid.   
 
Based on this plain plan language, we conclude that 
contributions owed by UPMC are calculated based on 
compensation paid to the employees and not based on 
uncompensated hours worked.  Henderson‟s focus on 
language other than these straightforward definitions is 
misguided.  See Fields v. Thompson Printing Co., 363 F.3d 
259, 268 (3d Cir. 2004) (declining to look beyond plain 
language of employment agreement when determining 
liability under ERISA).   
 
First, Henderson emphasizes that the Basic Retirement 
Plan links retirement credits to  “Compensation earned.”  
App. at 521 (emphasis added).  But, as UPMC properly points 
out, the use of the word “earned” by itself does not modify 
the definition of Compensation, which is limited to W-2 
reportable compensation, that is, compensation actually paid.  
Appellees‟ Br. at 19.  Moreover, in the face of the plans‟ clear 
definitions for compensation, there is no basis for 
Henderson‟s conclusion that “earned,” in this context, means 
“hours worked.”   Second, Henderson contends that 
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“compensation as reportable in Box 1 of Form W-2” is 
conditional, and that reportable means “the compensation that 
should have been paid and reported under the law.”  
Appellants‟ Br. at 33 (emphasis in original).  Again, 
compensation is only reportable, and required to be reported 
under the law, if it is actually paid.  Accordingly, 
Henderson‟s attempts to strain certain words or phrases as 
requiring that contributions be made based on hours worked 
are to no avail.
3
   
 
Our interpretation of the plan language in this case is 
consonant with the interpretation of similar language by other 
courts.  See Zipp, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (holding that plan 
which defined compensation as “amounts paid by an 
Employer to an Employee” meant that the employer was not 
required to document amounts “earned”); Mathews, 2009 WL 
3837249, at *5 (holding that plan, which based contributions 
on compensation as reported on Form W-2, meant 
compensation actually paid to employee); Steavens, 2008 WL 
3540070, at *4 (holding that plan which tied contributions to 
“earnings actually paid to an Employee by an Employer 
during a calendar year and reported on the Federal income tax 
withholding statement” meant compensation actually paid to 
employee). 
 
In contrast, when courts have held that an employer 
must keep track of hours worked, the plan language has been 
quite explicit in linking contributions to hours worked.  See 
                                              
3
 We note that under the Basic Retirement Plan, an 
employee is not eligible for Retirement Credits unless s/he 
has been “paid for 1000 hours of service.”  App. at 96.  
Arguably, this means that an employee‟s access to benefits is 
contingent on working 1,000 hours.  However, this initial 
threshold does not alter the fact that retirement credits, and 
the benefits associated with them, are based on an employee‟s 
pay or compensation.  Nor does Henderson allege that she or 
any of her purported class members were prevented from 
satisfying the 1,000-hour threshold as a result of UPMC‟s 
hour and wage practices.  Significantly, the 1,000-hour 
requirement is still linked to “paid” hours of service.   
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Trs. of the Chi. Painters & Decorators Pension, 493 F.3d at 
786 (“The collective bargaining agreement in this case 
required [the employer] to contribute benefits based on the 
hours worked.”); Mich. Laborers’ Health Care Fund, 30 F.3d 
at 694 (under the collective bargaining agreement, the 
employer “was required to make payments to each of the 
Funds for employees performing „covered‟ concrete-pouring 
work”); Combs, 764 F.2d at 820 (plan specifically based 
employer contributions on “hours worked” by employees).  
The plans here contain no such language.
4
   
 
Accordingly, in this case, the records “sufficient to 
determine the benefits due” under Section 209 are the records 
of the employee‟s compensation actually paid.  Nowhere is it 
alleged that UPMC in anyway failed to keep track of the 
compensation it did, in fact, pay to Henderson or her 
coworkers.  Indeed, as outlined above, based on an 
employer‟s payroll tax obligations to keep track of and report 
employee compensation paid, it is unlikely such a claim could 
be credibly made.  Moreover, because Henderson has failed 
to state a Section 209 claim against UPMC, any related claim 
that UPMC failed its fiduciary obligation under Section 404 
to investigate and ensure that contributions were being 
accurately provided to the fund also fails.  Ipso facto, to the 
extent Henderson is attempting “to recover benefits due to 
[her] under the terms of [her] plan” from UPMC as a 
fiduciary pursuant to Section 502(a)(1)(B) or seek injunctive 
relief under Section 502(a)(3), her claim fails because the 
                                              
4
  Henderson urges us to follow Gerlach v. Wells 
Fargo & Co., No. C05-0585 CW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
46788, *6-8 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2005), where, 
notwithstanding that the plan linked contributions to 
compensation paid, the court held that the employer was 
obligated to keep track of overtime that was never paid.  As 
evidenced by the long list of cases holding to the contrary, 
Gerlach is an outlier in refusing to follow the plan language 
and we decline to follow it.   
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plan links contributions and benefits due to compensation 
paid.
5
   
 
In so holding, we are careful to note that our decision 
does not prevent Henderson from bringing a subsequent 
action pursuant to ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) to recover 
benefits associated with any unjustly withheld compensation 
that she receives if she is successful in her state wage lawsuit.  
Indeed, at oral argument, UPMC agreed that were it to be 
established in state court that Henderson should have been 
paid for the additional hours she alleges, UPMC will make 
the corresponding contributions to these plans.  Were that to 
eventuate, Henderson would then have been paid reportable 
W-2 compensation to which contributions are linked.  
Accordingly, we see no reason to disturb the District Court‟s 
ruling dismissing the complaint with prejudice with respect to 
Henderson‟s claims for violations of Section 209 and any 
corollary fiduciary responsibility to monitor and ensure that 
contributions are being accurately provided.  However, as just 
stated, Henderson retains the right to bring a claim for 
benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B), if and when she is 
successful in her state wage lawsuit.   
 
Finally, having affirmed the District Court‟s dismissal 
for the above stated reasons, we need not reach the alternative 
issue raised by UPMC: whether plan participants are entitled 
to bring a separate cause of action for violations of Section 
209.   
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.    
 
                                              
5
  Henderson argues that because UPMC does not 
maintain records of the hours she claims to have worked, she 
may receive reduced pension benefits were she to prevail in 
her state court actions.  UPMC correctly responds that it has 
no responsibility to maintain such records under ERISA and 
under its plans. 
